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The decades of conflict in Northern Ireland created divisions between
communities, with few opportunities for cooperation. However, in the
1990s opposition to a proposed cross-border incinerator brought the
divided communities together. The 1990s economic boom in the Republic
of Ireland generated a waste management crisis as the by-products of
rampant consumerism overwhelmed the state’s rudimentary waste disposal
system. Three Irish anti-incinerator campaigns which have pitted local
communities against the Irish state or the Northern Ireland Department of
the Environment are examined. Community attempts to gain leverage
within the political governance frameworks in operation on both sides of
the border are examined and the various ways in which environmental
movements respond to the crisis of waste management under different
governance regimes are illuminated.
Keywords: community; mobilisation; governance; opportunities;
movements
Introduction
Anti-incineration campaigns emerged on the island of Ireland during a parti-
cular phase of economic growth with increased consumption in the Republic
alongside conflict resolution in the North from the late 1980s through to
the turn of century. The political frameworks that existed on both sides of the
border whilst these changes occurred are based on partnership agreements
between national and regional political entities or the local authorities and
the corporate sector. This wider political opportunity structure included
the European Commission (EC), and in the Northern jurisdiction, the UK
government, the Northern Ireland Office and the Department of Environment
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(DoE), as well as the post-1998 devolved Stormont Assembly and, in the south,
the government in Dublin and the waste management industry. Those opposed
to incineration technologies included a loose coalition of citizens with con-
cerns about health risks, environmentalists and, in the Northern case, both
nationalists and unionists who had historically been trenchant opponents
on almost every other local issue.1 We will argue that the partnership arrange-
ments that existed in both jurisdictions, but to different extents, from the
outset excluded communities that opposed incineration from the core of
political decision-making. Their campaigns achieved various degrees of poli-
tical access with differing consequences. We examine the dynamics and fea-
tures of three campaigns against incineration in the two political jurisdictions
in their governance context.
Following Rootes we note that community-based environmental move-
ments ebb and flow within local frameworks:
local environmental campaigns are ubiquitous and recurrent, even in times when
environmental issues are not salient on national agendas . . . Local environmental
campaigners are variously related to national and local organisations, and the
peculiarities of place are one factor in that variation. But place itself acquires
meaning through campaigns, and communities forge identity even as they
mobilise against threats to their survival. (Rootes 2007, p. 722)
Our focus here is on local environmental movement activism in the context
of waste infrastructure and its political governance. We will examine the
movement dynamics of three regional campaigns that occurred in the 1990s
and early 2000s in Derry, Galway and Cork regions. A waste management
crisis emerged as a result of increased consumption rates as economic growth
was achieved in the Republic and as a post-conflict process was emerging in
the North. European directives led to a shift from a traditional (over-)reliance
on landfill, with regional waste management plans including incineration
as an option for the first time. We also outline a series of dynamics in the
mobilisation of networks for the anti-incinerator and zero waste movements,
the role of experts and advocates with international experience of similar
campaigns, the significance of cultural capital in the mobilisation process, and
the differences in rural and urban campaigns. Finally we examine the extent to
which political access was achieved by community groups originally alienated
from the diverse systems of political partnerships in both jurisdictions.
Governing waste
Waste management issues and the broader issue of sustainable development
are, ultimately, issues concerning governance in contemporary societies.
Governance is taken to refer to the sum of interactions between civil society
and governments. Good governance is currently taken to include transparency,
effectiveness, openness, responsiveness and accountability. These are all criteria
by which we can legitimately evaluate the government of the day in respect of
its dealing with civil society and its concerns. So, if sectors of civil society –
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concerned individuals, community groups and environmental groups – have
concerns about the government’s waste management strategy (whether as
discrete projects or as an indicator of the broader concern with sustainable
development in particular), we can expect them to be dealt with according to
the internationally accepted criteria of good governance.
The essence of governance is its focus on mechanisms to govern society
which do not rest on the use of authority or of sanctions by government.
Forms of partnership with the organisations of civil society are one of the
preferred options of the governance approach. Following one of the authorities
in this area, ‘governance recognises the blurring of boundaries and res-
ponsibilities for tackling social and economic issues’ (Stoker 1998, p. 21). Both
in terms of strategic decision-making and of service delivery there is now a
growing critique of the ‘Westminster model’ (see Bache and Flinders 2005,
Bevir 2008) on the grounds that its centralised powers lack flexibility and
the necessary counterbalances. Government by central decree is becoming
increasingly unpopular in contemporary western society, and is often replaced
by a more consensual model based on multi-agency partnerships or some
hybrid model. The notion of governance (and particularly multi-level gover-
nance in an EU context) responds to these perceived weaknesses with an ideal
type stressing the complexity of modern-day political management and the
need for ongoing citizen participation in that process.
When we look at the production and management of waste it is useful to think
in terms ofmulti-scalar processes, where rescaling of waste production in the era of
glocalisation has occurred and where its successful management relies on
governance at multiple levels – global, regional, national and local. EU directives
on waste have been the key driver of waste management policy in Ireland (Fagan
et al. 2001). The European Economic Community (EEC) Act of 1972 gave direct
precedence to European acts over domestic laws and constitutional provisions in
the Republic and in Northern Ireland. The ratification of the Single European Act
(1986), the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)
further ensured the supremacy of EU law over domestic law. In its programme for
dealing with waste the EU produced legislation, which includes Directives on
dangerous substances, waste oils, groundwater, urban waste water, licensing
regulations, the disposal of PCB/PCT, toxic waste, sewage sludge in agriculture,
emissions from waste incineration plants, the disposal of animal waste, and
batteries containing dangerous fluids. It likewise set targets for reduction in all
waste streams, and set very specific timeframes for national governments to meet
these reductions. For example, for the Republic of Ireland’s municipal waste
stream, there is a national target of 35% recycling by 2013 and a household waste
diversion from landfill target of 50% by 2013.2
The state governance context
With the EU able to enforce sanctions on the nation-state and the national
government needing to radically change the direction and composition of waste
898 L. Leonard et al.
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flows, the drawing up and implementation of strategy quickly became an issue
of governance at a national level. Government by central decree on the waste
management issue was not an option since the government had moved to a
governance model patterned on consensual politics and multi-agency partner-
ships. From this perspective, self-governing networks in relation to waste
management were very much favoured by the state. The capacity to ‘get things
done’ did not simply rest on the power of government to command, and
commands would only be invoked in the last instance. In order to reach the
targets it was considered necessary to bring key players such as ‘private
enterprise’ into some form of partnership. In 2001 in the South there was a
need for an estimated investment of e1 billion over a 3–5 year period to
implement the waste development plan (Forfa´s 2001, p. vi) and the National
Development Plan envisaged this coming mainly from the private sector.
Clearly, Ireland faced a gruelling task to organise a strategy to divert waste
away from landfill, to reach targets set at a five-fold increase in recycling and to
find the finance for the infrastructure, especially if the objective was for the
private sector to answer this call. Private capital was thus seen a necessary
‘node’ in the governance of waste management (Fagan 2004). Offe’s (1987)
argument that the neo-corporatist system focuses on ‘technocratic criteria’ is
illustrated by the policies generated under these ‘crisis’ conditions. In such
conditions, the government’s gaze focused on the private sector and on the
waste industry’s multinational giants, leaving sustainability concerns second-
ary to costs and slow, deliberatively reached democratic solutions secondary
to immediate technocratic solutions. Waste governance in Ireland, from this
perspective, could not be resolved at its most radical level – that of sus-
tainability. The plans relied heavily on the treatment of waste through ‘thermal
treatment plants’ and on recycling to be funded primarily by private enterprise.
In short the partnership arrangements involved a hierarchisation of partners,
with the role of the community or civil society partners being to consent to the
technocratic logic of ‘getting things done’. Partners offering solutions to the
crisis and engaging in problem solving were ‘more equal’ in the partnership
than those who could be labelled ‘oppositionists’. Clearly the way governance
is implemented is part of this political process and should not be seen as a
deus ex machina. Being oppositionist brings with it a danger of exclusion from
partnership arrangements. Murray (2006) argues that such multi-level partner-
ship arrangements involving state and corporate entities may serve to further
isolate working class communities and also marginalise them from the
local community perspective. It is perfectly rational that in a ‘problem-solving
partnership’, ‘partners’ offering solutions to the crisis and engaging in problem
solving would be ‘more equal’ in the partnership than those labelled ‘oppo-
sitionists’ and risking exclusion from the prevailing partnership arrangement
(Gaynor 2008).
While governance necessitated consultation and the introduction of key
players into the process, the unequal balance of power in the consultations and
the fact that some partners were ‘more equal than others’ resulted in outright
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contestation of the plans in the South, where plans were about a year in
advance of those in the North. How did communities and activists contest their
respective government’s preferred waste management strategies? Discursively
they contested the strategy as ‘bad’ governance which they located in what they
termed a ‘non-consultative’ process. The environmentalists and local commu-
nities threatened by incineration plans were deeply critical of what they
perceived as the ‘fac¸ade’ of consultation that had been put in place (Fagan
et al. 2001, p. 18). There was a widespread perception at community level that
government ‘consultations’ (often dictated by EU regulations) on the develop-
ment of incinerators were simply empty rhetorical exercises for communities to
‘let off steam’ but were not designed to change decisions already taken on
technical grounds (Fagan et al. 2001, p. 19).
In the North, the proposed all-Ireland incineration plant for toxic waste
was blocked by cross-border and cross-community opposition. In the South
the opposition to the location of incineration plants began, fuelled by anger
about the nature of the consultation process that had produced the plans, and
drove the waste management strategy into political crisis in 2000–2001 as local
communities blocked the sub-regional plans. In the North, the failure of the
proposed DuPont plans for an all-Ireland toxic waste incineration plant
drove cross-border cooperation into the background. A second development
that minimised cross-border cooperation was, curiously, the impact of the
political backlash to the waste management plans in the South. Alongside the
opposition to the DuPont plant, that opposition to plans for large incinerators
in the South created a situation where the Northern planners watched with
horror as they saw the backlash against plans for large-scale incineration
plants unfold. Not wishing to go down the same road, waste authorities in the
North proposed many small incinerators instead and community buy-in was
considered to be a priority. Given, therefore, that there appeared to be no
urgent reason for anything but small-scale regional planning, cross-border
cooperation went on the backburner and no one seemed to be actually working
on developing an all-island strategy.
The Southern state moved into action against the blocking of the plans by
anti-incinerator activism. The first Environment Minister to deal with the issue,
Noel Dempsey, removed local councillors (who had been subject to public
will) from the decision-making process, and replaced them with the county
manager, a government employee. So, in response to challenge from ‘below’, a
central decree (government as opposed to governance) was used to achieve
the localising or embedding of waste management. This is not to say that the
Irish state entirely moved back to traditional government or rejected the
principle of consensus politics and failed to involve itself in multi-agency
partnership, but, rather, that it removed the locality from involvement in the
decision-making process. The next Environment Minister, Martin Cullen,
stated quite openly that the planning process on waste management was
‘over-democratised’ and that he did not believe it was ‘adding anything to
it by having so many layers involved’ (Irish Times, 12 August 2002, p. 1).
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The so-called ‘fast-tracking’ for waste management plans had to be
implemented, and An Board Plea´nala (the Planning Board) became a ‘one-
stop shop’ for assessing all plans for new waste management facilities. The
Minister, rather contradictorily, insisted that he was not removing the rights of
any groups or individual to express their views – ‘That is sacrosanct, but I don’t
see a need for these views to be expressed at so many different levels’ (Irish
Times, 12 August 2002, p. 1). In other words, repetition of oppositional views
at multiple levels in a multi-layered process of governance was a source of
irritation for government.
This suggests a particular multi-faceted and shifting dynamic of actors in
the governance process, with some gaining power and others losing it in a
complex political process of action and reaction. The discourse of governance
certainly did not ensure that the political will of communities would prevail.
That local communities were important players in the dynamic is without
question, but there were ebbs and flows in their political power. Let us look
in more detail at these in the three case studies that follow. In terms of
governance, the EU is a key player in that it regulates waste and sets the scene
for its regulation at national level. However, EU policy emerges from a
network of actors and competing agendas and is translated into national policy
through a similar network. While we can clearly see the European agenda
informed by concerns with environmental sustainability, we can equally see the
market-driven notions of development being played out when it comes to its
implementation at national level. At the implementation stage the contra-
diction between the concepts of economic development (market-driven in
its capitalist form) and sustainability (the earth as limited resource) play
themselves out, with the former being presented as more urgent than the latter.
Ireland: the North–South governance context
Prior to the Belfast Agreement which brought an end to the conflict in
Northern Ireland, cross-border cooperation had existed, as we will see in the
case of the DuPont proposal to site an all-Ireland toxic waste incinerator in
Northern Ireland. The DuPont campaign took place at a critical period in
waste management politics, North and South. Fagan et al. (2001) noted that
in both parts of Ireland waste management was entering a critical moment in
light of new EU regulations and the attitude of many local communities to
incineration in particular. European Directives that required governance
consistent with enhanced environmental sustainability were affecting industry,
commerce, local authorities and households in an increasingly direct way.
After intensive negotiations between the Irish and British governments (and the
various political parties), the specific nature and administrative form of North–
South cooperation was put in place in December 1998. Six North–South
implementation bodies were established, covering waterways, food safety,
trade and business, EU programmes, the Irish language and agriculture/marine
matters. Also, the so-called Trimble–Mallon statement in December 1998
Environmental Politics 901
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
ati
on
al 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 Ir
ela
nd
 M
ay
no
oth
] a
t 0
6:2
1 1
3 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
1 
contained an initial list of six matters for North–South cooperation through
existing North–South public policy bodies. These were to include transport,
agriculture, education, health, tourism and the environment, the latter specified
to include research into environmental protection, water quality and waste
management. So waste management in Ireland became part of an all-island
public policy framework. But we can also note that the Du Pont case pre-
political settlement had already refigured this outcome as waste management
was already being seen as an issue transcending political borders in a small
island.
Policy-makers on both sides of the border were facing the introduction of
significant targets, including a considerable reduction in the amount of waste
going to landfill, and increased energy recovery from waste. In 1988, the
Department of the Environment in the South commissioned consultants
to prepare a feasibility study on a ‘national’ toxic waste incinerator. By
1990, consultants on both sides of the border had advised their respective
governments of the desirability of an all-island solution to the challenge of
disposing of toxic waste. Key to considerations on both sides of the border
were developments at the European level. The ratification of the Single
European Act (1986), the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the EC Waste
Strategy launched in 1989, enshrining the principle of sustainable development,
combined to force governments in Dublin and Belfast to make waste
management a domestic priority. The principle of ‘self sufficiency’ in dealing
with waste disposal was established in European legislation in 1991 and
economies of scale pointed to the need to cooperate. As a Northern Irish civil
servant put it succinctly in 2001 ‘the whole North/South thing is where [waste
management] is going to happen’, and according to him two things were
fundamental: ‘one is scale and the other one is working together’ (Fagan et al.
2001, p. 44).
Case study I: DuPont, Derry (Northern Ireland)
In one of the island’s most celebrated campaigns against a proposed toxic
waste incinerator, communities in Derry and Inishowen took on Derry’s
biggest and most important employer, DuPont, at Maydown on the outskirts
of the city. During the 18-month campaign (1990–1991) a question of environ-
mental justice merged with the dominant concerns of citizens and communities
emerging from a deep political conflict and history of communal division.
Derry – sometimes regarded as the crucible of the civil conflict and nationalist/
Republican assertion of their civil and political rights – provided the mise en
scene for a successful campaign, which would tap into a number of discourses
drawing from a distinctive political culture and set of historical circumstances.
Not least of these was the ease with which Protestant and Catholic, Unionist
and Nationalist, citizens and politicians contradicted the dominant narrative
of division and conflict to make common cause in their assertion of the city’s
and region’s right to say ‘no’ to what was widely regarded as an imposition
902 L. Leonard et al.
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cooked up by outsiders, including corporate actors at DuPont and government
ministers in both Dublin and Belfast. This case study provides valuable
material for an understanding of how divided communities might mobilise
around environmental issues and the way new environmental discourses
are constructed on pre-existing community consciousness. The name of the
DuPont company was already known on both sides of the border when the
Derry campaign was launched. In 1974, the company had given consideration
to the establishment of a plant at Cork Harbour to extract titanium dioxide
from limonite ore from Australia. Controversially, the company had proposed
to dump the resulting waste in the open sea. Sixteen years later, the anti-
incinerator campaign took place at a critical period in waste management
politics, North and South.
The origins of the proposal for an all-island incinerator were recommenda-
tions set out in a feasibility study commissioned by the Republic’s Department
of the Environment. In turn, consultants commissioned by the Department of
the Environment in Northern Ireland recommended that the Department
engage with its counterpart in Dublin. This was the background to a visit by
Flynn to the DuPont plant in 1990. The company engaged the Irish Govern-
ment with a view to importing 14,000 tonnes of the proposed incinerator’s
projected 20,000 tonnes annual capacity for treatment at its Derry facility. The
company ruled out ‘importing’ waste from Britain to the largely nationalist
city of Derry. Allen (1992) concluded that the consultants’ suggestion that
there should be a cross-border solution to the toxic waste challenge which had
bedevilled successive Dublin governments seemed to offer a way out for the
Irish state.
Reviews of waste strategy on both sides of the border had coincided with
DuPont’s plans to upgrade its incineration capacity at the Derry plant.
Economic considerations for the industry, including the prospect of grant aid
to DuPont, merged with the logics of the European Commission’s first broad-
based communication on waste, A Community Strategy for Waste Management
(1989), including the ‘proximity principle’. The consultants advising the
Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland, Aspinwall and Co. Ltd,
for example, noted that the waste markets on the island could not support
incinerators in both Northern Ireland and the Republic, unless operators were
to consider importing wastes from other countries. The consultants noted that
proposals for a single viable incinerator servicing the waste markets in both
jurisdictions would fall within the spirit of the 1989 Waste Strategy, especially
since DuPont had each year been exporting 700 tonnes of hazardous waste to
Finland and France for incineration.
Activists from Derry and Donegal reacted with shock when they learned of
the proposals to site an all-island incinerator at the DuPont plant, five miles
outside Derry, in early 1991. Local political representatives were also quick to
respond to the announcement and an emergency meeting of Derry City
Council’s Environmental Protection Committee convened. The Social Demo-
cratic and Labour Party (SDLP) group, which controlled the Council at the
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time, relayed the ‘alarm and concern’ among local politicians. While consensus
emerged amongst Nationalist and Unionist politicians, their opposition was
based on a variety of arguments. Some Unionist politicians, reflecting the deep
resentment stirred by the Anglo-Irish Agreement, opposed Dublin’s inter-
ference. Sinn Fein representatives, with close ties to grassroots community-
based organisations, were quick to articulate technical, economic and social
arguments against incineration. The grassroots campaign, for the most part,
maintained a firewall between cross-community and cross-border activism and
the role of local politicians, and elected representatives from political parties
were not encouraged to address public rallies.
DuPont’s proposal was to take toxic waste from across the island to ensure
the technical and financial viability of the new plant. The imported element
would come from chemical and pharmaceutical companies based in Dublin
and Cork. Du Pont launched Northern Ireland’s biggest ever industry-spon-
sored public information campaigns to explain its plans and offer reassurance
to the local population. The Derry population was not known for its interest in
environmental issues (Allen 1992, p. 3). Key drivers of the initial campaign
formation were prominent activists based in Donegal, just across the border,
in the Republic of Ireland. A feature of the cross-border campaign was the
distinctive mobilising narratives deployed on each side of the border. While
established community-based environmental lobby groups in Inishowen,
Donegal, focused on the perceived pollution threat, the debate in Derry
focused as much on issues of the rights of the community to participate in
decision-making, failures in environmental governance, and the economy. The
Derry-based campaign thus resonated with that city’s historical identification
with public protest in pursuit of civil and economic rights.
The cross-border campaign was launched at a meeting in Derry in January
1991. Within 24 hours, at a meeting of Derry City Council’s Environmental
Protection Committee, opposition to the incinerator proposal was made clear.
A campaign ‘Briefing Paper’ (1991) drawn up by the Derry Development
Education Centre set out a number of influences on the campaign and key
arguments that place the events in context, on the eve of the UN Conference on
Environment and Development. The major considerations for campaigners
included: the 1972 London Convention to outlaw the dumping of waste and
incineration in the North Sea; a local history of industrial toxic waste disposal
on farmland; a perception that accommodating industry’s preference for
incineration could reduce pressure to address waste prevention; the risk
of large amounts of toxic waste being transported to Derry and the risks
associated with Derry becoming a magnet for all future toxic waste generated
on the island; the scientific uncertainties surrounding the ‘cause–effect’
relationship between industrial pollution and public health; a perception that
pollution monitoring had been ‘piecemeal’; and a failure to enforce emissions
regulations and punish those in breach of regulations.
Having noted that the proposed site for the incinerator was closer to
villages in the Republic of Ireland than to the city of Derry, campaigners
904 L. Leonard et al.
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discussed their suspicions about atmospheric pollution drifting across Lough
Foyle from Derry to Donegal. The Inishowen Environmental Group in
Donegal tapped into these suspicions to mobilise public support for the anti-
incinerator campaign, claiming that marine and air pollution from industrial
activity in Derry had already resulted on both sides of Lough Foyle.
The focus for the mobilisation of groups in Derry and its environs was a
development education centre, with trade union ties and funding. The Derry
Development Education Centre (DDEC) played a key role in providing a
secretariat for a network of 63 local groups, many of them specifically set up in
neighbourhoods for the purpose of opposition across the city and on both sides
of the border. The Centre exploited links with the trade union movement,
international development and environment NGOs, and industrial health and
safety networks. The DDEC worked alongside veteran community develop-
ment organisers, some with a history of campaigning and mobilisation
stretching back to the early civil rights movement in the city in the late 1960s.
Conventional campaign tactics were deployed, including public rallies, a media
strategy, lobbying, theatre and fund raising.
The campaign counted support from local bishops, elected representatives,
the media, farmers’ groups, including the Ulster Farmers Union, community
groups, doctors, trade unions and women’s groups. They drew on advice from
a number of professionals within their ranks, including energy consultants,
engineers, marine biologists, farming experts, architects and health workers.
The campaign also had significant access to research and expertise from across
Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Greenpeace advisors
offered support on the media strategy and tactics.
Timeline for the Northern campaign
November 1988: Then Republic of Ireland Environment Minister, Padraig Flynn,
commits to incineration as a long-term solution to the chemical industry’s waste
problem, speaking at a conference in Cork. He commissions consultants, Byrne
O’Cleirigh, to prepare a feasibility study on a ‘national’ toxic waste incinerator.
February 1989: Report by the consultants, Byrne O Cleirigh, commissioned by
Flynn. Tenders for a national incineration project invited in the Republic of
Ireland.
June 1990: Consultants Aspinwall and Co. Ltd present findings on the future of
waste disposal in Northern Ireland, in a report commissioned by DoE NI. They
include a recommendation that NI Ministers undertake joint discussions with
their counterparts in the Republic of Ireland. The talks would determine the
feasibility of including Northern Ireland in the Republic of Ireland’s proposals for
high temperature incineration. The consultants’ report cited the EC Waste
Strategy (1989).
December 1990: With no decisions taken on tenders for the Republic of Ireland
facility, Flynn visits Du Pont in Derry, to pursue possible cooperative
arrangements involving the administrations in Belfast and Dublin.
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Ultimately, DuPont announced in December 1991 that it was abandoning
the incinerator plan. Underlining the importance of local autonomy and
democratic decision-making as a feature of the campaign, the company
attempted to signal that the final corporate decision had been taken at an
international level ‘so that both the responsibility for and the cause of deciding
not to proceed appeared to be taken out of the local arena’ (Jordan and Gilbert
1999, p. 2).
An editorial published in the main local newspaper, The Derry Journal
(3 May 1991), had come out in strong support of the anti-incineration
campaign and neatly located the campaign’s arguments within the historical
and political context of the city. The editorial stated that there were good
reasons for the opposition given that the city had suffered enough from
discrimination from Stormont governments over two generations. Local
people, it continued, were in no mood to allow the installation of a plant
they believed would damage its environmental attractiveness and stunt hopes
for an economic revival. The editorial concluded with a warning to both the
Northern Ireland Office and the Dublin Government: ‘The dismissal of
community protests from Derry played a major part in precipitating the civil
rights movement in the North. The toxic incinerator has become the biggest
5 December 1990: Du Pont submits application for planning permission to replace
a solid waste burner to burn lycra waste. (Du Pont never submitted a request for
permission to develop the proposed all-island facility.)
18 January 1991: The Inishowen Environmental Group in Donegal poses key
questions about DuPont proposals in an article published in the Derry Journal
newspaper.
21 January 1991: 120 people attend an anti-incineration briefing and launch of
campaign in Derry’s Central Library.
21 January 1991: Greenpeace/Cork Environmental Alliance meets Derry City
Council officials. At least one solidarity rally was staged in Cork to coincide with
a protest convened in Derry during the 1991 campaign.
30 January 1991: Formation of Campsie Residents against Toxic Emissions,
involving residents living in the environs around the Du Pont plant.
31 January 1991: The Economy Minister for Northern Ireland, Richard Needham
MP and the Environment Minister for the Republic of Ireland, Padraig Flynn,
meet at an Anglo-Irish conference in Dublin and discuss the proposal for an all-
island facility at DuPont.
16 March 1991: First anti-incineration rally in Derry.
20 August 1991: Du Pont announces that it is to begin an environmental impact
study (EIS) in preparation for a planning application for an all-island toxic waste
incinerator.
December 1991: DuPont announces that it is abandoning plans to build an all-
island incinerator at its Maydown plant in Derry. The decision, which had been
taken out of the hands of the Derry plant operators, is attributed to strategic
financial considerations.
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issue to command support across political divides since those times. Both the
Northern Ireland Office and Dublin should tread warily.’
Frames and meanings
Jordan and Gilbert (1999) have studied the ‘competing discourses’ or
‘distinctive social meanings communicated through the use of language’ which
were at work during the Derry incinerator dispute. They concluded that
while both supporters and objectors shared the language and discourse of
‘environmental management’, only the objectors mobilised around ‘environ-
mental representation’ and this imbalance contributed significantly to the
defeat of the proposed incinerator. As Jordan and Gilbert (1999) noted, unlike
expert discourse, the discourse of ‘environmental representation’ does not rely
upon a strict bifurcation of ‘environment’ and ‘community’. The objectors
successfully established legitimate claims by drawing on this discourse,
rhetorically tying a particular social grouping or community to a particular
physical space and environment (Jordan and Gilbert 1999, p. 5), as captured in
one quotation recorded in the Derry Journal (27 September 1991):
Too often the word ‘environment’ is used in a narrow and restricted sense as
almost exclusively confined to the physical surroundings . . . If the environment
includes all aspects of surroundings then the cultural and social dimension is just
as important as the physical and the geographical and must be included in any
environmental impact assessment.
Emerging from conflict, and anticipating a ‘peace building’ era of new
choices about infrastructure, the economy and the nature of local development,
the DuPont campaign forced open debates that other parts of the island
had already rehearsed. Environmental and health considerations were framed
by a strong sense of local community. For historical reasons, activist com-
munities in both Derry and Inishowen were wary of remote government
decision-making and a perceived neglect in terms of economic and develop-
ment outcomes. This gave a very local and context-specific flavour to argu-
ments around access to information and participation in environmental
decision-making. The political environment created by the highly contested
Anglo-Irish Agreement deepened suspicion on the Unionist side, while on the
nationalist side promises of job creation came to be seen as an attempt by
the authorities to exploit Derry’s status as an unemployment blackspot rather
than a bona fide attempt to redress an historic injustice.
Jordan and Gilbert (1999, p. 10) suggest that the Derry dispute was
essentially a political debate concerning human relations. Protagonists used
ostensibly ‘environmental’ concepts to frame arguments concerning appro-
priate social relations, in this case about decision-making over local develop-
ment. One letter writer to the Derry Journal (22 January 1991) was quite
explicit in challenging the paper’s editorial writer to accept that a ‘community
values’ perspective was just as valid as that of scientific expertise, which must
be assessed given that ‘the history of science and technology, or rather the
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history of the use of science and technology reveals an absence of objectivity
and very strong value loading’.
Case study II: Galway for a Safe Environment (Republic of Ireland)
The regional waste plans for the Republic of Ireland included three options:
landfill (which was the destination for over 90% of the country’s waste),
recycling and incineration. The inclusion of plans for an incinerator at certain
named locations in and around the western city of Galway caused local
professionals to instigate a campaign of opposition to the siting of the plant,
while their campaign would emerge into a wider anti-incineration campaign
with extended links regionally and globally, while attempting to influence the
2002 General Election (Leonard 2005). The local campaign of Galway for a
Safe Environment (GSE) opened up three main frames: highlighting health
risks; embracing wider politics and going ‘beyond NIMBY’; highlighting
democratic deficit.
These three frames were not distinct, and tended to overlap as GSE’s
leadership attempted to politicise their campaign by moving ‘beyond NIMBY’
(Szasz 1994). The initial phase of the campaign gave rise to a series of protests,
marches and media appearances that allowed GSE to highlight the issue of
health risks posed by incinerator emissions. GSE’s health frame provided many
potent images for the anti-incineration activists to manipulate in order to
create issue salience amongst the public. All aspects of community politics were
integrated into GSE’s anti-incinerator repertoire, including exploiting anti-
abortion sentiment still prevalent in the wake of two referendums on that
contentious issue. (GSE promoted the image of dioxins in baby’s milk as one of
the main health risk concerns.) Furthermore, GSE outlined the damage caused
to processes when pastures and farms were exposed to toxins including furans
and dioxins in emissions from incinerators. This was done in order to exploit
another cultural frame based on existing concerns about toxic pollution from
multinationals in rural areas.
In so doing, GSE was able to extend the cultural frame to embrace rural
environmental sentiment, while also preventing a rural/urban divide, some-
thing that would have benefited its opponents (Leonard 2008b). This strategy
emerged from the prior experience of some GSE committee members, who had
knowledge of anti-incinerator campaigns in Canada. These links to interna-
tional anti-toxics campaigners such as Professor Paul Connett of St. Laurence
University, New York, would provide GSE with a vast resource of scientific
data that provided the basis of their health frame. In fact, GSE were able to
provide a great deal of information on incineration to the public, local
politicians and media sources, to the extent that the interest-driven data came
to shape the debate, with the state and industry being forced into a reactive
stance. The forms of action taken by the Galway campaign included a mix of
street protests outside of City Hall, with spokespersons addressing alternatives
such as the recycling based ‘Zero-Waste’ approach to waste at special meetings
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of the local authority. In this way, the Galway campaigners were able to
maintain pressure on the local political structure, while providing a level of
expertise to the local (and national) debate through their wider networks. At
the height of its campaign, GSE was holding major public meetings debating
the issue live on the evening news while its petition against incineration
received 22,000 signatures in a city of 70,000.
This mobilisation of support was also reflected in the extent to which GSE
influenced local councillors, who went on to reject the regional waste plan.
Many councillors publicly stated that GSE’s campaign had influenced their
decision, while many reported an upsurge in voter concern on the issue. The
state’s response to this rejection of its waste policy was to rescind the decision-
making powers of all regional councils on waste management issues, a move
that provided GSE with the political opportunity of extending the democratic
deficit frame. For GSE and its supporters, the state’s initial approach to
pushing through incineration without consultation or referring to any potential
health risks in the regional plan was one example of a lack of accountability on
transparency on the issue. However, the removal of the councillors’ decision-
making powers allowed GSE to re-frame the campaign by attempting to gain
wider access to the political structures on a national level. The key opportunity
for that strategy presented itself through the 2002 General Election. As the
balance of political opportunities (another significant aspect in determining
campaign outcomes) surrounding the anti-incinerator campaign continued to
shift, GSE was able to extend the democratic deficit frame, gaining further
leverage during the general election campaign. Having decided against running
its own candidate in order to facilitate supportive political figures from the
mainstream, GSE began to merge its three main frames into an offensive
against Fianna Fa´il, the main party of government. Moreover, while Fianna
Fa´il had targeted three seats in Galway West, GSE created strategic alliances
with one government party (Progressive Democrat – PD) candidate and one
opposition party (Greens) candidate to increase the chances of having a
supporter in government (Leonard 2005). Ultimately, the return of the Fianna
Fa´il/PD coalition to power dealt a major blow to GSE’s attempt to politicise
its campaign. Essentially, GSE’s key political alliances had proved to be no
more than a ‘perceived’ opportunity (Tarrow 1998), rather than the key
leverage that would lead to the campaign influencing policy at a national level.
Nonetheless, while municipal incinerators for Cork and Meath (near Dublin)
were announced in November 2005, any such plans for Galway had been
shelved, with Fianna Fa´il keeping one eye on the potential for populist
backlash in future elections.
Case study III: Cork Harbour for a Safe Environment (Republic of Ireland)
Another site in the Republic, Cork Harbour, was part of a series of municipal
incinerators announced by the state as part of seven regional waste plans in
Dublin, the South-East, Galway, Limerick, the Midlands and the North-East
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(Fagan 2003, p. 67). Communities in these areas campaigned against the
proposed incinerators, using collective action frames to create understandings
about the potential health risks posed by incineration. The Cork campaign had
marked similarities with GSE’s, as political opportunities were provided by the
state’s technocratic approach to including mass-burn incineration:
One can see that incineration is the contested terrain in this case, as not one
government policy or regional plan mentions the word ‘incineration.’ The word
used repeatedly and pointedly is ‘thermal treatment plant.’ As in all conflicts, the
discourse itself marks the terrain and the use of the work ‘incineration’ as
opposed to ‘thermal treatment plants’ marks the political division. (Fagan 2003,
p. 78)
Moreover, the state’s own attempt to frame the waste issue in a less than
up-front manner provided the first political opportunity for community
campaigners challenging the regional waste plans. In December 2001, Indaver,
the Belgian incineration company involved in all of the regional plants, lodged
a planning application for a 100,000 tonnes per annum incinerator for
hazardous and non-hazardous industrial waste, as well as an incinerator of
equal size for municipal waste, at a site at Cork Harbour. This incinerator was
opposed by activists in the Cork Harbour/Ringaskiddy area, which had been
the site of previous disputes about toxic dumps and industries. This provided
their campaign with further leverage due to the existence of many activists who
had taken part in previous campaigns. As such, the resources of campaign and
scientific expertise could be more easily mobilised. The proposed incinerator
was opposed by local residents, who formed an alliance from the many existing
environmental groups in the Cork area, under the name of the Cork Harbour
Alliance for a Safe Environment (CHASE). The campaign gained momentum,
and CHASE was able to claim to ‘represent the views of 24,000 people’ (Irish
Examiner, 19 September 2003). CHASE followed similar strategies to Galway
for a Safe Environment, by establishing a network of environmental groups,
mounting a campaign of public protests and meetings. However, CHASE had
one major difference in its strategic approach: it focused on a direct challenge
to Indaver, rather than attempting to influence the political process. Indaver
and the state were keen to site their incinerator at Ringaskiddy, Cork Harbour,
as ‘60% of all hazardous waste in Ireland comes from Little Island and
Ringaskiddy’ (ibid.). Links were established between CHASE, GSE and the
No Incinerator Alliance in rural County Meath, as resources and expertise
were exchanged between the groups.
The CHASE campaign saw the appearance of many of the women and
children in white boiler suits and oxygen masks, holding ‘No to Incineration’
placards, and presenting a striking visual profile (Irish Times, 17 January 2004).
CHASE was able to frame the ‘moral discourse’ (Grove-White 1993, p. 20)
surrounding the issue, depicting the children in a way which highlighted their
potential exposure to the health risks of dioxins. The dispute was taken to a
series of oral hearings, held at the Neptune Stadium in Cork. In this way, the
campaign led by CHASE manifested itself in a manner that had become the
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norm for environmental disputes in Ireland. As legal challenges may only
provide ‘partial access’ (Tarrow 1994, p. 86) but entail high costs, oppositional
campaigners have less often had recourse to law than the EPA and the
government. This is the reason such a strategy was avoided by Galway for
a Safe Environment. Such strategic decisions provided GSE with a level of
success, in contrast with CHASE. After a campaign lasting over two years,
An Bord Pleana´la (the Planning Commission) refused permission for the
Ringaskiddy waste scheme on the grounds that the Environmental Impact
Statement was inadequate, an incinerator for non-hazardous industrial
waste was contrary to the Cork Waste Management Plan, would contravene
materially the zoning of the site primarily for industry and enterprise, the scale,
nature and purpose of the development would be fundamentally unsuitable
to the site and ‘that it would be close to high density housing’. These were
amongst 14 points given for the refusal of planning permission at the site (The
Irish Times, 17 January 2004).
The senior planning inspector’s report ran to over 300 pages, and rejected
Indaver’s plan for an incinerator on the 14 counts. CHASE claimed a complete
vindication of its position on the issue, as many of its objections formed part
of the inspector’s rejection of the incineration scheme. However, both the
inspector and CHASE were soon to find that An Bord Pleana´la would overrule
the refusal and grant planning permission for Indaver’s proposed plant, citing
the prioritisation of government waste policy over all other considerations.
An Bord Pleana´la also had to consider the state’s waste management frame-
work, in which there is a preference for incineration over landfill. The board
also considered the geographical location of a number of large-scale chemical
and pharmaceutical industries operating in the Cork Harbour Area, and stated
that Indaver’s plant was ‘an appropriate location for a necessary public utility’
(Irish Times 17 January 2004). It also stated that such a plant would ‘not injure
the amenities of the area or be prejudicial to the future for port-related
development’ (ibid.). The then Green party representative for the Cork
South Central constituency, Dan Boyle, said this decision was a ‘political’ one,
and accused the board of ‘caving in’ to government pressure. He questioned
the fairness of the planning process, adding that the campaign against the
plant would continue: ‘This battle now moves to its next stage, where many
thousands who have campaigned against this incinerator will look for some-
thing in the planning, political and judicial process that can deliver them true
justice’ (ibid.).
However, the state’s response to CHASE, which included the granting of a
limited degree of access through the oral hearing, followed by the overriding of
An Bord Pleana´la Inspector’s own findings, represented a reversal of fortunes
for the CHASE campaign, and indicated the limitations of the oral hearing
approach for public campaigns, something which has been noted about
previous community campaigns in the Cork region (Peace 1997). The CHASE
campaign demonstrated how creating ‘increased access’ (ibid.) and the ability
to create ‘alignments’ with existing environmental activists in the Cork area,
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together with limited support from allies such as An Bord Pleana´la’s inspector,
provided assistance. Nevertheless, ‘the strength of state’ (Tarrow 1994, 1998)
was the decisive factor, as the state overruled the Board’s inspector in the
interest of pursuing its wider policy aims.
Conclusion: growth, waste and peace in the new Ireland
We have examined the mobilisation and constellations of political opportu-
nities surrounding the governance of waste in both jurisdictions in Ireland.
Each of the campaigns met with differing outcomes, due to the nature of
the political frameworks in those jurisdictions. The three Irish case studies
presented here demonstrate differing responses by social mobilisations to the
state’s governance of waste management. Despite what many consider to be
the two political success stories of recent times in the two jurisdictions –
the ‘peace process’ and the establishment of a devolved, consocial Assembly
in Northern Ireland, and the rise of the neo-corporatist ‘social partnership’
arrangements which underpinned the ‘Celtic Tiger’ economy in the Republic –
local communities have suffered severe fears about the risks of incineration
and are unable to have their concerns dealt with without resorting to social
mobilisation. While the major political agreements represent a considerable
achievement, they have created a degree of exclusion for those groups that
remain outside the socio-economic and political elites that have emerged in
Belfast and Dublin in the last two decades.
Davies (2007) and Garavan (2007) have examined the impact of environ-
mentally orientated community movements in Ireland. Despite having local
political access and expertise, community campaigns have been excluded from
the political core in both jurisdictions due to the influence of neo-corporate
partnerships that prioritised growth over community concerns in the South,
and the nature of the consocial but politically weighted Assembly in the North,
which was developed to accommodate the sectarian political divide rather
than environmental or other ‘social’ concerns. In the main, these groups are
representative of those without power under the new political dispensations.
Non-economic actors such as women’s groups, the unemployed, immigrants
and environmentalists have been marginalised by the coalition of mainstream
parties, trade unions, large farmers’ groups and the business lobby in the
Republic, and in the North by most of the political parties, whose focus is on
controlling the levers of power in the Assembly.
In the Republic of Ireland, there is a tendency within the existing neo-
corporatist system to focus on the technocratic aspect of policy-making capa-
city which creates difficulties for political parties who wish to represent the
concerns of the professional middle class, due to the tendency of professionals
to have concerns that go beyond the economic. This void can be filled by the
campaigns of environmental movements, as public sector professionals such as
academics and those with alternative forms of expertise mobilise and challenge
the structures of closed corporatist power. The critique of closed political
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systems in European states such as Germany and Austria can be applied to
Ireland’s own system of neo-corporatist closure with the question: ‘What is it
about neo-corporatist arrangements that have stimulated the development of
Green movements in those countries’ (Scott 1990, p. 144)? While this question
may not be as relevant in the Irish case, the persistence of environmental
campaigns and the emergence since 2007 of the Irish Green Party as partners in
a coalition government dealing with the incineration issue provides some
congruence with European Green movements.
Corporatist and neo-corporatist centralised arrangements and the processes
of inclusion or exclusion that result from the state’s facilitation or repression of
access to political structures creates a ‘dimension of political opportunity’
(Tarrow 1994, 1998) for movements such as environmental campaigners.
‘Inclusive’ corporatist arrangements are usually ‘restricted to employers and
organised labour’ (Scott 1990, p. 144). The restricted nature of corporatist
arrangements ‘means that groups excluded from these processes may mobilise
at grassroots level, knowing that ‘normal’ challenges are closed off’ (ibid.).
As political opportunities evolved on various levels during this period,
external political factors, such as economic growth, wider North–South
cooperation, EU legislation and the formation of the EPA all influenced the
events surrounding these cases.
The apparent disregard by authorities for communities in both jurisdictions
in Ireland can be seen as the primary contributing factor (and political
opportunity) for environmental movement responses to policy. These various
movements shared certain features, and drew from similar pools of internal
and external resources, as an anti-multinational and NIMBY frame in the
1970s and 1980s gave way to concerns about the negative impacts of the
economic boom in the ‘waste management’ frame of the 1990s and 2000. GSE’s
own campaigns were able to use these internal and external resources, as the
shifting dynamic of political opportunities evolved, and ‘influential allies’ were
available. The volatile pattern of political opportunities also provided ‘unstable
alignments’ (Tarrow 1994, pp. 85–89) as the state’s own legislative framework
on waste issues remained concentrated on profitability rather than sustain-
ability, and provided local successes for regional campaigns. As the Irish state’s
aim of eight regional incinerators has now been reduced to just three (in
Dublin, Meath and Cork), local ‘success’ has been offset by these revised plans
for larger incinerators in urban areas.
The political outcomes for individual campaigners have been equally
mixed. In 2006, the Green parties in both jurisdictions were unified. In 2007,
the Greens had their first representative elected to the Assembly in Belfast.
Prominent southern Green party members had come to the fore in local anti-
incinerator campaigns. The Greens took the ultimate step towards increasing
their access to power after the 2007 general election by entering a coalition
government with Fianna Fa´il (Leonard 2008a, b). The emergence of the Green
party as a coalition partner has had mixed results in relation to incineration,
with disagreement about three of the originally proposed eight incinerators
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continuing. Their combination of framing approaches, combined with the
utilisation of EU directives as the basis for legal challenges, represented
some success for community groups opposed to the state’s waste policy. While
plans for incinerators in Dublin (Poolbeg), Meath (with planning permission
announced in July 2008) and Cork are still part of state policy, campaigners
have continued to oppose their introduction. The Irish Greens have been
criticised for their participation in a coalition government which has continued
attempts to introduce incineration.
Events in Northern Ireland surrounding the Du Pont campaign seem to
vindicate the findings from interviews and focus groups that one of the clearest
problems there ‘is the democratic deficit in terms of the participation in the
construction and implementation of policy’ (Fagan et al. 2001, p. x). Fagan
et al. advocate genuine forms of consultation and participation at all stages of
the waste management process that might reduce particularistic local reactions
against state policies and practices. This was, in part, a response to views
such as those found among local authorities that tended to see the issue of
waste management in terms of how to avert local opposition to incineration
through financial inducements and by bypassing local councillors. This may be
a self-defeating approach given that research has shown that the type of
‘environmental empowerment’ necessary for good waste management practice
occurs when community control over environmental events exists. Northern
Ireland’s government has also continued to develop plans for an incinerator in
the Belfast region, with environmental groups remaining vigilant.
These case studies demonstrate the complexities surrounding the issue of
state or corporate plans for dealing with an ongoing waste crisis in the face of
local community concerns about the environment. We have demonstrated that
from a governance perspective, the dichotomies between centralised forms of
power and community-based movements derived from local political alliances
indicate the need for local consultation at the planning and implementation
level. While this may delay the introduction of critical infrastructure required
by existing levels of consumption, the benefits for the wider political process
would include an increased sense of confidence in the processes of development
in regions that, for whatever reason, may feel marginalised from the central
planning process. The responses of community groups in both jurisdictions
can also be seen to have impacted on local politics, and provided an outlet
for concerns about wider issues such as democratic deficit. The prevalence of
community responses indicates the extent to which degrees of populist local
governmentality are manifested in Ireland’s body politic in both the North and
the Republic. Ultimately, this embedded form of community politics creates an
initial but significant layer of civil society which provides an outlet for local
political concerns about corporate or state activity, empowers local actors,
instigates local political careers and augments local flows of knowledge and
networking on issues such as health, politics and regional planning, thereby
enhancing the political opportunity framework in a manner that goes beyond
NIMBY concerns with the development of regional repertories of power.
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While such power is by its very nature transient and fleeting, the temporary
leverage it provides creates moments of access for community activists in a
manner which is rarely replicated. As such, the significance of local campaigns
such as those described here becomes apparent, as local movements can be seen
to make an important contribution to the development of community values,
meanings and identities.
Notes
1. Manlio Cinalli (2002) has drawn our attention to some interesting specifics of
environmental politics in divided societies.
2. The latter stood at 19% in early 2009, and the former at 34%.
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